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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this court is based upon U.C.A. § 78-2-2 (4): The 
Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over 
which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the trial court erred in denying Plaintiffs claims for 
alienation of affections and intentional infliction of emotional distress even 
though the Plaintiff admitted that for purposes of summary judgment that her 
complaint was filed within four years of when she discovered the source of 
the alienation? Whether claims for intentional torts are barred by the Health 
Care Malpractice Act? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On review of a grant of summary judgment or a motion on the 
pleadings treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 12, the 
party against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the 
facts presented and all the inferences fairly arising there from considered in 
a light most favorable to her. Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289 
1 
259 P.2d 297 (1953). Moreover, the appellate court reviews conclusions of 
law for correctness without according deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
AUTHORITIES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
Plaintiff is unaware of any Utah cases that address the specific issue 
of when a therapist's actions exceed the scope of their employment and 
thereby shift the cause of action from a medical malpractice to an intentional 
or negligent tort. However, Plaintiff relies of Lounsbury v. Capel, 191 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 40(Ct. App. 1992) to show that the Utah Courts have recognized 
that when a physician exceeds the scope of his employment a cause of action 
for battery can result which is an intentional tort and not a mere cause of 
action for negligence. In addition, Plaintiff also relies on cases from other 
jurisdictions which further analyze this issue and state when a physician has 
exceeded their medical malpractice insurer's liability. These authorities 
included Mary Roe v. Federal Insurance Company, 587 N.E. 2d 214(1992) 
and Marx v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 183 Neb. 12, 13(1968). 
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In relation to the alienation of affection claim Plaintiff relies on 
Norton v. MacFarlane, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, (Utah 1991) which address 
the issue of when someone in a special position of trust like a professor or a 
psychiatrists alienates ones spouse's affections from the other. Norton 
continues that Defendant's actions must be a controlling cause of the 
marriage destruction. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff originally contacted Defendant in order to help counsel her 
two daughters. Plaintiff and her spouse(James) would attend the meetings in 
order to check on the progress of their children. Defendant began to develop 
feelings for James to such a degree that she initiated an intimate relationship 
with him prior to the filing of the divorce between Plaintiff and James. 
James and Defendant were eventually married. Plaintiff alleges as a result 
of Defendant's conduct her marriage greatly suffered to the point it was 
destroyed thereby causing the tort of alienation of affection. Plaintiff also 
alleges that Defendant's malicious conduct caused Plaintiff to suffer 
emotional harm. 
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At issue in this case is whether Defendant's conduct exceeded the 
scope of her employment. Plaintiff would argue that Defendant conduct was 
intentional and since the tort for alienation of affection does not require a 
patient-therapist relationship, neither tort is covered by the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act. After Plaintiff filed her complaint, Defendant filed a 
motion for Summary Judgment. The Trial Court, Honorable Sandra N. 
Peuler presiding granted Defendant's motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Apellee, Kathleen Bullen(Bullen) was a licensed clinical social 
worker, engaged in: interviewing, counseling and/or providing 
professional therapy with respect to Appellant, Suzanne 
Dowling's(Dowling) family as a whole and to her daughters. 
2. Dowling, acting upon BullenDs representations, reasonably believed 
that Bullen was a therapist and/or professional counselor. 
3. Bullen practiced with and was believed to be employed by, Canyon 
Rim and Trolley Corners. 
4. Dowling was married to James Anthony Hoagland, Jr., (James), and 
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they resided in their marital home in Salt Lake City, Utah, with their 
two(2) children prior to their divorce on September 26, 1996. 
5. In December 1994, Dowling's two daughters began counseling with 
Bullen. 
6. In February 1995, Dowling, along with her two daughters and James, 
began family counseling with Bullen. As a result of Bullen's position 
as a special position of trust in the eyes of Dowling. The family or 
various members of the family attended counseling with Bullen until 
approximately June of 1996. 
7. During that time, the two daughters continued therapy sessions with 
Bullen, during which Bullen included Dowling in the last 1/3 of each 
session. 
8. During January 1996, James Hoagland filed a Petition for Divorce 
from Dowling. 
9. In February of 1996, one month after James filed for divorce, Bullen 
suggested to Dowling seek another counselor, namely Susan 
Culbertson. 
10. On or about September 26, 1996, James was granted a divorce from 
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Dowling over the objection of Dowling. 
11. Near this same time, James and Bullen announced that they were 
dating, and they were eventually married. 
12. Dowling later learned that Bullen had initiated an intimate 
relationship with James, prior to the filing of the petition for divorce. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
When reviewing the facts of this case it becomes clear that the trial 
court erred in granting the Defendant's summary judgment motion. Under 
either a motion to dismiss standard or a summary judgment standard the 
Plaintiff's allegations in her complaint and affidavit, viewed in the light 
most favorable to her, support several causes of action against the 
Defendant. 
On the Plaintiffs first claim of Alienation of Affection as well as the 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim, there are several material 
issues of fact in dispute which, if proved, would allow a jury to find in the 
Plaintiffs favor. 
Thus, the decision of the trial court should be reversed and Plaintiff 
should be allowed to proceed to discovery and submit her evidence to a jury. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ALLOW 
THE PLAINTIFF TO SHOW THAT SHE WAS NOT A 
PATIENT OF THE DEFENDANT 
The trial court refused to accept the fact that Plaintiff was not a patient 
of the Defendant. Plaintiff attended various sessions to review the 
progress of her children. When she would attend the last third of each 
session, she was there to help the girls and not to receive counseling for 
herself. Her presence can more closely by analogized with a parent 
attending parent teacher-conferences then a patient-therapist relationship. 
It should also be noted that all of the bills were in the daughter's names 
and not the Plaintiffs. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO ACCEPT 
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS THAT HER CLAIMS EXIST 
INDEPENDENTLY OF ANY PATIENT-THERAPIST 
RELATIONSHIP. 
The tort of alienation of affections and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress exists independently of any patient-therapist relationship. Neither of 
the elements to prove the torts for alienation of affection or the intentional 
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infliction of emotional distress require that there be a patient-therapist 
relationship. In fact none of the Utah case law states that a patient-therapist 
relationship is one of the elements to establish either of these two claims. 
Plaintiffs claim could prevail even if she had never had contact with 
Bullen in a therapy setting. This is because Plaintiffs claims do not stem 
from any actions from Bullen as a therapist. Instead they relate back to 
Defendant's intentional conduct to steal Plaintiffs husband and to cause 
great emotional distress to Plaintiff. 
III. INTENTIONAL TORTS ARE NOT PROTECTED BY THE 
HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT AND THEREFORE 
ARE NOT LIMITED TO THE TWO YEAR STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
The plaintiffs causes of action are intentional torts - they are not based 
on a negligence theory and are thus not contingent on either 1) a doctor-
patient relationship or 2) a special duty of care. In other words, these are 
claims that may be brought regardless of the profession of the Defendant, 
and they have a four-year statute of limitations. 
Generally malpractice insurance does not cover intentional torts, but only 
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torts committed in the scope of practice. Here the plaintiff was not the 
patient of the defendant and was thus outside the scope of the doctor-patient 
relationship. The best analogy is that if my doctor negligently drops a book 
on my toe at church, I have a cause of action against him sounding in 
negligence - with a four-year statute of limitations. If, on the other hand, he 
removes the wrong lung in an operation, I have a malpractice claim, because 
it was within the scope of treatment. It would be patently unfair to allow a 
doctor a two year statute of limitations for all his or her actions simply 
because he/she has a medical degree. 
This distinction is recognized by the Utah Court of Appeals in 
Lounsbury v. Capel 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 836 P.2d 188(Ct. App. 1992) 
1992 Utah App. Lexis 123(1992)., in which it references a battery claim 
against a physician based on lack of consent: 
A battery is an intentional tort which, by definition, is not a cause of 
action for negligence. A claim in battery or trespass may lie . . . where 
an operation is performed without the patient's consent or where the 
operation is not the surgical procedure to which the patient gave his 
consent. By contrast, where the consent to the treatment was given but 
with insufficient or incomplete disclosure of risks, the cause of action 
is in medical malpractice based on negligence of the physician to meet 
a recognized standard of care. Baltzell v. Van Buskirk, 752 S.W.2d 
902, 906 (Mo. App. 1988). 
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For further understanding of this point we must look to other 
jurisdictions. The landmark case on defining what is professional services is 
Marx v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 183 Neb. 12, 13(1968), coming 
from the Supreme Court of Nebraska. The clearest interpretation of this case 
and others of a similar ilk comes from California in Mary Roe v. Federal 
Insurance Company, 587 N.E. 2d 214(1992) which began by reiterating the 
Nebraska decision, "A medical malpractice insurer's liability is... limited to 
the performing or rendering of professional acts or services. Something 
more than an act flowing from mere employment or vocation is essential. 
The act or service must be such as exacts the use or application of special 
learning or attainments of some kind." 
The California Court then further extrapolated on this case by 
outlining four considerations. The most pertinent are the last two: 
(3) that, when there is a complaint of malpractice, attention should 
focus on the act or service performed rather than the fact that the 
alleged wrongdoer was a physician or dentist because 'the scope of 
professional services does not include all forms of a medical 
professional's conduct simply because he or she is a doctor or dentist' 
Niedzielski v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 134 N.H. 141, (1991) 
and (4) that, to fall within the insuring language like that used here, 
there must be a causal relationship between the alleged harm and 
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complained-of professional act or service, that is, it must be a medical 
or dental act or service that causes the harm, not an act or service that 
requires no professional skill. Common sense of course, will always 
provide a useful guide in differentiating covered from uncovered 
cases." 
When considering the facts it becomes apparent that the two 
intentional torts committed by the Defendant were acts outside the scope of 
her employment. 
a. Alienation of Affection 
The first tort to be considered is alienation of affection. The elements 
of alienation of affection are: 1. the fact of marriage, 2. that the Defendant 
willfully and intentionally 3. alienated the spouse's affections(Defendant's 
acts must be the controlling cause and this must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence) 4. resulting in the loss of comfort, society and 
consortium, 5. malice(to justify punitive damages). When reviewing the 
elements it can clearly be established that the Defendant meets all the 
requirements: 
1. The fact of marriage. 
Plaintiffs first encounter with Defendant was while she was still married. 
Both Plaintiff and James were trying to make the marriage more successful. 
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Since all marriages have high and low periods it is hard to gauge what 
makes one marriage better than another one. The one fact that is clear is that 
both Plaintiff and James wanted to stay married and were doing everything 
in their power to make their marriage stronger. 
2. That the Defendant willfully and intentionally, 
3. Alienated the Spouse's affections(Defendant's acts must be the 
controlling cause and this must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence.). 
The Defendant knew that her actions would lead to the break up of the 
marriage. She willfully and intentionally became involved with James, 
knowing that this would alienate him from Plaintiff. Without Defendant's 
third party intervention Plaintiff and Defendant would be in a different 
situation today. The court has specifically addressed the issue of when 
someone in a special power situation alienates one spouse's affections. In 
Norton v. MacFarlane, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 818 P.2d 8(Utah 1991). The 
defendant was the doctor of the plaintiff's wife. The court stated: 
There are those in special positions of power, status, or authority who 
may illicitly use sex to satisfy their own passions or for otherwise 
improper ends. There are any number of such relationships, i.e., 
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professors and students; physicians and patients; psychiatrists, 
psychoanalysts, or psychologists and clients; and employers and 
employees. Those who use positions of power or authority for the 
purpose of obtaining sexual favors and produce an alienation of 
affections between the one in an inferior position and his or her spouse, 
abuse and overreach any legitimate power they may have. In such cases, 
the consequence may be not only the breakup of one or perhaps two 
marriages, but also unforeseeable consequences in the future lives of the 
children from such marriages. Nelson v. Jacobsen 669 P.2d 1207, 
1222(Utahl983) (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting). 
We do not now, however, make the existence of such a relationship a 
necessary element in the proof of causation. We view the enumerated 
relationships, and others in which one may improperly use power, status, 
or authority to obtain improper and illicit sexual favors, as examples of 
what can be evidence of causation. When such relationships exist and are 
improperly exploited, the causation issue may be more easily resolved. It 
is, however, possible that the "subordinate" party may also use the 
relationship for his or her own ends. Certainly, the mere existence of such 
a relationship does not suffice by itself to establish causation in an action 
for alienation of affections, but it may be probative of the causation 
element if the "superior" party abuses the relationship for illicit sexual 
purposes. In any event, we make clear that the tort will lie, even if no 
such power, status, or authority relationship exists. 
Whether or not there is such a relationship, we hold that a plaintiff must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was the conduct of 
defendant that constituted a controlling cause of the injury to a spouse's 
consortium interests and that his or her conduct was not just incidental to 
other causative factors that destroyed or damaged the marriage or 
conjugal relationship. Norton v. Macfarlane 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 818 
P.2d8(Utahl991). 
4. Resulting in the loss of comfort, society and consortium. 
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When reviewing the facts of this case it is clear that there can not be a 
greater loss of comfort, society and consortium then the divorcing of two 
parties. In addition, we must argue that the relationship was not severed 
until the divorce became finalized, or in the alternative that there must be an 
objective standard, in order to prevent Defendant from claiming that love 
was lost years before. We may be able to argue that using the subjective 
standard of the Defendant, is prejudicial to the Plaintiff, and does not 
recognize the principle that it is when the Plaintiff is injured that the statute 
of limitations begins to run. This rule is consistently applied in other areas 
of tort law. 
A court will seek to make the damages "proportionate" to the loss of the 
injured spouse. On the issue of damages, the court will consider such factors 
as the duration and quality of the marriage relation, including the extent to 
which genuine feelings of love and affection existed between the spouses 
prior to the intervention of the Defendant. Nelson v. Jacobsen 669 P.2d 
1207,1222(Utah 1983). Here the Plaintiff must prove damages due to the 
loss of the relationship. In this case, the Plaintiff has submitted a long list of 
damages. 
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5. Malice (to justify punitive damages). 
In this case the malice arouse when Bullen put her needs before all those 
around her. She was jealous of the relationship that she saw between 
Dowling and James. This jealously caused her to act in an unethical manner 
in that she stole someone else's husband. She had fallen in love with her 
patient's father. She knew that any action on her part to form a relationship 
with James would cause great emotional distress to Dowling. 
a. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
To sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a 
plaintiff must show that: 1. The conduct was outrageous and intolerable in 
that it offended against the generally accepted standards of decency and 
morality; 2. defendant intended to cause, or acted in reckless disregard of the 
likelihood of causing, emotional distress; 3. plaintiff suffered severe 
emotional distress; and 4. defendant's conduct proximately caused Plaintiffs 
emotional distress. See Samms v. Eccles J 1 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 344, 
346-47 (1961); White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1317 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1990U01 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 844 P.2d 949 cited by Retherford v. AT&T 
Communications of Mt. States, Inc. (Utah 1992) 1992 Utah Lexis 120. 
1. The conduct was outrageous and intolerable in that it offended against the 
generally accepted standards of decency and morality 
Here, the Defendant breached a rule of professional conduct. While 
not dispositive of the issue, it a breach of professional conduct is evidence of 
standards of decency and morality. The average person would find that 
even on the most basic levels an affair with a married man breached the 
commonly held moral standards. 
2. Defendant intended to cause, or acted in reckless disregard of the 
likelihood of causing, emotional distress 
The Defendant entered her relationship with James with eyes wide 
open. She is a licensed clinical social worker someone whose sole 
employment purpose is to help people work on strengthening relationships 
with others and with themselves. It is inconceivable that she was unaware of 
the ramifications of her actions when she became involved with a married 
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man. Especially since she was clearly on a familiar basis with the wife and 
children. 
3. Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress 
As a result of Defendant's actions Plaintiff has suffered tremendously. 
In addition to loosing the companionship of a spouse. Her financial situation 
is also very precarious. She has lost the companionship of having a spouse. 
Instead of raising her children with a partner she must bare the emotional 
and financial burden primarily alone. 
4. Defendant's conduct proximately caused Plaintiff's emotional distress 
Plaintiff was making every effort to save her marriage up until the 
point that she learned that the Defendant had turned her husband against her. 
Defendant's conduct was the gravamen in destroying the marriage between 
Plaintiff and James. Before they met Defendant they were both trying to 
work on improving their marriage. 
The timing of when the tort occurs is different for emotional distress 
than it is for alienation of affections. In Retherford (supra), the court stated: 
Often, however, emotional distress does not so much occur as 
unfold~for example, where a defendant subjects a plaintiff, not to a 
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single outrageous act, but to a pattern or practice of acts tolerable by 
themselves though clearly intolerable in the aggregate.... We have 
been unable to locate authority that is directly on point concerning the 
application of statutes of limitation to a pattern of conduct that 
constitutes, in the aggregate, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. However, we find the treatment of claims of alienation of 
affections instructive in this regard. In adjudicating such claims, 
which often allege a series of wrongful acts over a substantial period 
of time, courts have determined that the statute of limitations begins to 
run when the alienation is accomplished, i.e., when love and affection 
are finally lost. See e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 244 Ark. 327, 424 S.W.2d 
871, 874 (Ark. 1968); Dobrient v. Ciskowski, 54 Wis. 2d 419, 195 
N.W.2d449,451 (Wis. 1972); see also Flink v. Simpson, 49 Wash. 2d 
639, 305 P.2d 803, 804 (Wash. 1957); Strode v. Gleason, 9 Wash. 
App. 13, 510 P.2d 250, 254 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973). Applying this 
standard by analogy, we hold that the statute of limitations for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress does not begin to run until 
the distress is actually inflicted, i.e., when the plaintiff suffers severe 
emotional disturbance. Retherford v. AT&T Communications of Mt. 
States, Inc. (Utah 1992) 1992 Utah Lexis 120. 
IV. THE PLAINTIFF FILED HER CLAIMS WITHIN THE 
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD. 
The proper statute of limitations period for Alienation of Affections is 
four years. Hodges v. Howell 4 P. 3d 803, 2000 Utah App. 171, 397 Utah 
Adv. Rep 3 (Ct. App. 2000). 
The statute of limitations for alienation of affections "begins to run 
when alienation is accomplished i.e. when love and affection or finally lost." 
Rutherford v. AT&T Communications 844 P. 2d 949 (Utah 1992). (That is 
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a question of fact for the jury. Andreni v. Hultgreen 860 p. 2d 916, 919 
(Utah 1993). See also Hodges v. Howell 4 P. 3d 803, 2000 Utah App. 171, 
397 Utah Adv. Rep 3 (Ct. App. 2000). This has been defined as "the point at 
which a person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal 
injury"). 
In this case, the Plaintiff filed her complaint on September 25, 2000. 
The divorce was granted over Suzanne's objection on September 26, 1996. 
Thus we can argue that the Plaintiff filed this claim within four years of the 
divorce becoming final. Which is the objective measure of when the 
relationship was severed. 
The proper statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress is four years according to U.C.A. § 78-12-25. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision that Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be granted was fatally flawed for a number of reasons. 
The first reason is the mere possibility that there was a patient-therapist 
relationship does not automatically force the tort claim from one of an 
19 
intentional tort to being encompassed by the broad penumbra of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act. 
In addition the Court failed to take into consideration the fact that the 
torts committed by Defendant far exceeded to scope of her profession. 
Thereby preventing the torts from falling under the Malpractice Act. 
The various cases of this jurisdiction and others that have more 
closely addressed the issues at hand, show that it is possible to have a 
medical profession exceed the scope of their profession and no longer be 
covered by malpractice insurance. This fact alone should allow this case to 
proceed past the Summary Judgment Motion. 
DATED this 3 day of Qj/UU , 2002. 
WINGO & RINEHART 
Kathleen McConkie 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUZANNE 
KATHLEEN 
DOWLING, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
VS« ) 
BOWEN, ) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. 000907667 
Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
October 28, 2002 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER 
Third District Court Judge 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
KATHLEEN McCONKIE 
Randle, Deamer, McConkie, Lee 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 330 
Salt Lake Cityr Utah 64111 
Telephone: (801)531-0441 
PHIL FERGUSON 
Christensen & Jensen 
50 South Main Street 
Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801)355-3472 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe CSR/CCT 
1771 SOUTH CALIFORNIA AVENUE 
PROVO, UTAH 84606 
TELEPHONE: (801)377-0027 
r/vA ouxo/o^ao* KINKOS OF PRQVQ 
•a 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on October 29, 2002) 
THE COURT: Good afternoon. Let me indicate we're 
on the record. The matter before the Court at this time 
is a hearing in the case of Dowling versus Bullen, case 
No. 000907667, and I'll ask Counsel to state your appearances 
for the record. 
MS. McCONKIE: Kathleen McConkie, your Honor, appearing 
on behalf of Ms* Dowling. 
THE COURT; Thank you. 
MR. FERGUSON; Phil Ferguson for the defense. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I did have an opportunity to 
review the pleadings that you filed. I did not — although 
I appreciate receiving copies of the cases, did not have an 
opportunity to read any of the cases, so you might point out 
if there's some that I maybe should have read. 
Mr. Ferguson, if you would like to go ahead and start. 
I just need to find a clean piece of paper before you start 
talking to me. Okay. 
MR. FERGUSON: I hope your desk is cleaner than mine. 
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
MR. FERGUSON: I said I hope you can find one on your 
desk. 
THE COURT: I did actually just threw a bunch away. I 
hope I didn't need them. 
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MR, FERGUSON: As the Court undoubtedly knows, as 
you've indicated having read the paperwork, this case involves 
what I think is a relatively straightforward issue, and it's 
primarily a legal issue. That's whether an alienation of 
affections claim that realizes in the context of a therapy 
relationship is governed by the statute of limitations in the 
medical malpractice act. I think that is about as succinctly 
as we can put it. I don't think that there's any dispute over 
the dates, or we're not taking issue at this stage at least 
with the substance of the allegations. 
The crucial base are that the plaintiff alleges that 
my client destroyed her marriage by persuading her husband to 
have sex with her sometime prior to January 1996; and that as a 
consequence of that the husband filed a petition for divorce, 
THE COURT: Is the January *96 date one of the dates 
that was in the complaint? 
MR. FERGUSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm just trying to make sure I 
remember where the dates came from. 
MR. FERGUSON: Okay. That's alleged in the complaint. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. FERGUSON: The divorce became final nine months 
later in September, September the 26xh, 1996, and that is the 
date that Ms. Dowling says she learned that the therapist had 
been involved with her husband. So the issue is whether if you 
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use September the 26th, 1996 is the date of the beginning of 
the statute of limitations, how long do you have before you 
have to file your lawsuit. That's the easiest way to look at 
this. There are arguments for using earlier dates. That's 
the latest date that's available to the plaintiff under the 
complaint allegation to the Court. 
Our position is pretty straightforward. This is a 
claim for therapist malpractice. It's governed by the Utah 
Healthcare Malpractice Act, which applies to therapists. It 
gives to plaintiff two years from the date that she knew or 
should have known of the negligence and the harm to file a 
case, and she alleges in her complaint that she knew on 
September the 26fcS 1996 that my client had been negligent, 
or as she puts it, actually intentionally interfered with 
the marriage, and that the marriage in fact was destroyed. 
So everything sort of points to September the 26th, 1996. 
Under the statute she had two years. That two years 
expired September the 26th, 1998. She didn't file anything 
until September the 26th, 2000. So she waited an additional 
two years. Under the plain language of the statute the case 
is barred, and should be dismissed as to all of these I think. 
THE COURT: Now, when are these — I was wondering if 
you should go through the complaint and tell me if there are 
any causes of action as you look at them that you believe were 
not covered by the two year statute of limitation, I know that 
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a proposed complaint was filed and I'm not dealing with that 
yet, but the complaint that's on file. 
MR. FERGUSON: No. All of the allegations in the 
complaint relate to or arise out of the therapy. Ms. Dowling 
alleges disclosure of confidential information was obtained 
in the therapy process. She alleges that during the therapy 
process Ms. Bullen had sexual relations with her husband, 
which was a breach of the duties that pertain to therapists, 
specifically the code of ethics that applies to therapists, 
and that she breached her fiduciary duty that she held as 
a therapist to the family. All of which are of course 
malpractice allegations. There are no allegations in the 
complaint that relate to anything other than malpractice. 
They're all covered by the statute of limitations. 
The one case that we cited that I think pretty well 
analyzes the whole theoretical framework is the case of Jensen 
versus IHC. In that case — it's a very complicated case, but 
the essence of it is that a woman had a complicated pregnancy. 
She went into the hospital for a C-section. Due to some 
negligence in the course of that C-section she was rendered 
unconscious and essentially totally disabled, and lived in a 
persistent vegetative state for three-and-a-half years. At 
which point she died. 
During that three-and-a-half year period of time she 
was transferred to a couple of different hospitals and there 
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was some intrigue by the lawyers and the doctors. Within 
two years after she died the family filed a lawsuit alleging 
wrongful death and medical malpractice, as well as fraud or 
covering up the claim. 
The Supreme Court said, *This case is not governed 
by the wrongful death statute. It's governed by the medical 
malpractice statute." The family said, *Well, how can we sue 
until she dies? We should at least have two years from the 
date she dies." The Supreme Court said, *No, death isn't 
the injury here. The negligence that resulted in her being 
comatose is the injury, and the statute of limitations begins 
to run from that point." 
So the cause of action for this medical malpractice 
had expired before the patient actually passed awayf and tbe 
Supreme Court said, *We will not allow a wrongful death cause 
of action. This is governed by the medical malpractice 
statute 
The family then says, '"Well, gee whiz, we didn't know 
a lot of this stuff. It was covered up by the doctors in the 
hospital. We've also filed a claim for general fraud." The 
Supreme Court said, ^Appreciate your creative thinking, but 
fraud doesn't cut it- It's covered by the medical malpractice 
statute." 
The medical malpractice statute has a provision in it 
that allows for tolling in the event of fraud, and if you can 
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prove your fraud then fine, the statute won't run, but you 
don't get a different statute. You get one statute, the 
malpractice statute. That's the one that governs your claim. 
That's the one that we're going to apply. We'll allow you to 
try and prove fraud. If you can't prove fraud, you don't have 
a case. 
That reasoning applies here. There's no difference 
between an alienation of affection claim and a wrongful death 
claim or intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 
or a breach of fiduciary duty claim. They all arise in the 
context of this medical malpractice. They're all governed by 
the Healthcare Malpractice Act. The statute ran, and the case 
should be dismissed. 
There are other cases that we cite to that discuss 
various aspects of the Malpractice Act, but I think Jensen 
versus IHC is probably the one that deals with that — what I 
guess I would call the pivotal issue; does the statute apply 
here. If it applies, it's just way too long. If it doesn't 
apply, then perhaps she's got an argument. 
The plaintiff cited no cases that said it didn't 
apply. There's just no authority at all to tell us why 
alienation of affection should be treated differently than 
wrongful death or fraud or anything else. So I don't think 
there are any cases. I couldn't find any cases. We cited 
those that we thought were most appropriate. 
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1 I'm happy to address the statute of repose if the 
2 Court would like, but I don't think itfs necessary. That 
3 simply says that you have two years to file your lawsuit from 
4 when you knew or should have known, but in no event do you get 
5 more than four years from the date of the negligence. In this 
6 I case the negligence happened before January *96, when my client 
7 I supposedly enticed the plaintiff's husband into bed. Four 
8 years from January *96 is January 2000. No way to bring the 
9 case any later than that under any circumstances. 
10 j Based on that we're, you know, we're prepared to 
11 I submit it, unless you have some questions. 
12 J THE COURT: No, the only question I have is tangential. 
13 That is as it relates to other defendants. This is Ms- Bullen's 
14 motion for summary judgment. 
15 MR. FERGUSON: Right. 
16 THE COURT: And so we're not dealing with the other 
17 defendants at this point; is that right? 
18 MR. FERGUSON: I think that's a fair statement. To my 
19 understanding none of the other defendants have been served. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. FERGUSON: They're not really part of the case. 
22 I They're named, but nothing's been done with respect to them. 
23 They did not treat Ms. Bullen — even the allegations of the 
24 complaint are that they're a partnership somehow and liable for 
25 I her conduct. They're not a partnership, but none of that has 
i \ j . imu3 Uf r i tUVU a 
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really been developed, and they haven't been served and they're 
not really before the Court. 
THE COURT: Okay, and are you still wanting me to 
consider the failure to prosecute under 41-B, that argument? 
MR. FERGUSON: Only if you don't consider the statute 
of limitations. I think that the failure to prosecute in — 
well, let me back up. Somewhere along the way I saw that there 
had been an order to show cause in this case. 
THE COURTJ Okay. 
MR. FERGUSON: I was not aware of that, but I saw 
the minutes from the clerk indicating that there had been 
communication between Ms. McConkie and the clerk's office, and 
that the Court had given additional time — 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. FERGUSON: — for discovery to be done, and when I 
filed this motion including the failure to prosecute, I was not 
aware of that order to show cause situation. I think in light 
of that, and in light of the Court's ruling on that order to 
show cause, it doesn't make sense to pursue the failure to 
prosecute. 
THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate that. Thank you. 
Would you like to respond, Ms. McConkie. 
MS. McCONKIEr Thank you. The alienation of affection 
claim is not governed by the Healthcare Malpractice Act. For 
one reason because the defendant herself denied that the 
ivAiiivuo ur r n u v u IgJOll 
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1 plaintiff was ever a patient of defendant/ and that you can 
2 find in the answer to her complaint No. 9, 13, 16 and 19. 
3 I The idea behind the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act is 
4 that it governs healthcare providers relating to — or arriving 
5 out of the health needs of their patients, and it doesn't 
6 I really necessarily apply to nonpatients. Now, Ms. Bullen 
7 herself has denied that there was ever a therapist/patient 
8 I relationship between Suzanne Dowling and herself. In fact, 
9 she has stated that she only treated the children. 
10 I Because the defendant did not provide healthcare 
11 services directly to the plaintiff, she can't claim the 
12 J protection of the shorter statute of limitations as a 
13 I procedural requirement of the Healthcare Malpractice Act. 
14 To put it simply, even if Ms. Dowling did not know 
15 that Ms. Bullen was a therapist, even if she were not a 
16 I therapist, even if she didn't know her she would still have a 
17 J relevant claim that she committed — to the extent that she 
18 alienated the affections of Mr. Hoagland, Ms. Dowling's former 
19 husband. 
20 I The reason why this case should not be dismissed 
21 for failure to file from the statute of limitations is the 
22 I statute of limitations for the tort of alienation of affection 
23 is four years, and that's discussed in the Hodges v. Howe case. 
24 I That case said the statute of limitations for alienation of 
25 affection begins to run when alienation is accomplished, when 
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love and affection are finally lost. 
The questionr then, is when the statute begins to run 
or when the alienated spouse's affections are finally lost is 
a question of fact. It's not a question of law. That's the 
Andreeny versus Hopefree that we cited. The Andreeny case says 
that the time when the statute finally begins to run has been 
defined at the point at which a person reasonably should have 
known that he or she has suffered a legal injury. 
Now, we talk about th^ day. The divorce was granted 
in September. So September 26^, 1996, but the plaintiff only 
became aware of the cause of her husband's estrangement at that 
time, and up until that time she was attempting to make every 
effort to save her marriage. 
It was only after the plaintiff clearly understood 
the defendant was involved in a romantic relationship with her 
husband that she became aware that she suffered that legal 
injury. It was — and at that point she did file within the 
statute of limitations. She didn't file on September 26th 
of 2000. She actually filed on September 25th, one day before 
that. 
It is well settled that a tort cause of action are 
proved when all of its elements come into being and the claim 
of action and the defendant has conceded for purposes of this 
motion plaintiff only became aware of the relationship between 
her husband and herself in September of 1996, and you can find 
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that on their memorandum in support of Defendant Bullen's 
motion for summary judgment of April, too. 
In addition, there are factual disputes at issue. 
Under Utah law a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's 
actions were the controlling cause in the breakup of their 
marriage. That's in the Norton v. McFarland. 
In that case the Court considered a complaint in which 
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's actions were the 
controlling cause of the breakup of the marriage, and also that 
the defendant abuse of special relationship between him and the 
patient alienates the wife's affection. 
Now, the Supreme Court reversed appellate Court 
in that case, holding that these allegations along with the 
existence of a special relationship were sufficient to succeed 
a summary judgment motion. 
So even in the absence of a special relationship 
between the defendant and the spouse, a claim for alienation 
of affection does apply. However, the existence of a special 
relationship if the facts — or the finder of facts have 
considered (inaudible) when the elements of the tort have 
been proven. 
So there are some issues that are in dispute there. 
No. 1, was there a special relationship that existed between 
the defendant and the plaintiff's husband; No. 2, if so whether 
that relationship was controlling and was it the cause — the 
w 
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controlling cause of the breakup of the marriage; and No. 3, 
was the defendant willfully and intentionally (inaudible) 
alienated the affections of James Hoagland towards his wife. 
These are all factual questions for a jury and are therefore 
inappropriately decided upon a motion for summary judgment. 
Now, we disagree with the assertions that defense made 
that the Healthcare Malpractice Act protects all actions of 
healthcare providers, because they only protect the actions of 
those in the course of treatment. Now, the core of defendant's 
argument is that by virtue of the mere fact that defendant is 
a healthcare provider she is shielded from all liability under 
the Healthcare Malpractice Act. 
Nowr under defendant's reading of the statute, any 
healthcare provider would be protected by the two year statute 
of limitations no matter what the tort. Thus, under this 
reading a doctor who dropped a medical dictionary on the toe 
of his client would be — the patient would be immune from 
anything but the malpractice action simply by virtue that he is 
a healthcare provider even if he dropped the book intentionally 
from a five story window. The same analysis of requiring 
notice of intent to commence and action and a prelitigation 
panel for doctors who intentionally punches a patient in the 
face. 
So defendant's reading of the statute, you read it 
saying that every tort would be under the Medical Malpractice 
-15-
1 Act would give super status and extra protection simply by the 
2 virtue of their occupation for medical provider. Under this 
3 interpretation a plaintiff who sues a doctor for damages based 
4 on caused by the doctor's drunk driving would nevertheless need 
5 I to request a prelitigation panel and comply with the other 
6 I formalities of the act. 
7 Clearly there are limits to the kinds of acts that 
8 are protected under the malpractice statute, and a healthcare 
9 provider is not immune from suit simply because of her status , 
10 but only when the actionr as the statute says, complained of 
11 arises in the course of treatment, 
12 Now, Ms. Bullen herself said that Ms, Dowling was not 
13 a patient, and certainly even if we were to agree that we're 
14 I taking — in terms of the argument we're saying that she's not 
15 her patient, but even if she were her patient, certainly would 
16 the Court decide that an illicit affair was something that 
17 occurred out of the course of the treatment between the 
18 healthcare provider and the father of the patients — of 
19 the two daughters who were the patients in this matter. I am 
20 I unconvinced that the medical malpractice statute covers those 
21 kinds of actions» 
22 I would — I appreciate the fact that the Court 
23 J will not consider failure to prosecute. I would just for 
24 the information of the Court like to say that I did have a 
25 discussion with Jay Jensen early on about doing a planning and 
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scheduling conference, and at that time he was going to file 
an immediate motion to dismiss and we decided to wait until it 
happened. I made an attempt to contact him on that, and he 
apparently hasn't been well and the case has had some delay in 
getting reassigned. So just for the information of the Court, 
that's what happened, Judge. 
The plaintiff's claim for alienation of affection was 
filed within the four year statute when the plaintiff learned 
that she'd suffered a legal injury. Because Suzanne Dowling 
was never a patient of the defendant, the Utah Healthcare 
Malpractice Act does not apply in this case, and 
the plaintiff's complaint specifically (inaudible) all of the 
elements of alienation of affection, many of which are disputed 
factual matters. Therefore, it would be inappropriate that 
this motion — that this case should be dismissed, and the 
Court should allow the plaintiff to prove each element at 
trial. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you two questions if I could. 
MS. McCONKIE: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Based upon the fact that you're arguing the 
alienation of affection cause of action/ are you conceding that 
the other causes of action are going to fall by the wayside 
because there's a statute of limitations? 
MS. McCONKIE: I think that the other causes of action 
are going to fall by the wayside. 
-17-
THE COURT: Okay, and the second thing, second question 
that I had is I don't remember seeing in the summary judgment 
pleadings that I reviewed any issue about whether or not there 
was a therapist/patient relationship. I thought there was some 
mention that the whole family was involved in therapy at some 
point. 
MS, McCONKIEs Well, what happened was that there 
had been some difficulty in the family, there had been some 
stress in the family. The family had decided to come because 
of Mr. Hoagland's anger problems and because the children were 
stressed and I think probably because there was marital stress, 
and they brought the children in to see Ms. Bullen. 
Now, initially my client assumed because she sat — 
she did sit in on a number of those, and so did Mr. Hoagland, 
but my client never received therapy from — individually 
from Ms. Bullen. In fact, Ms. Bullen herself denied that she 
ever had a patient/therapist relationship. I think my client 
believes what maybe there might have been a patient/therapist 
relationship, but for purposes of this argument we're saying we 
don't think there was. So therefore she denied it. 
THE COURT: Well, and understand, if you will, the only 
thing — the only record that I have at this point is what's 
contained in the file. So where would I look in the pleadings 
to find what's disputed or not relative to that, 
MS. McCONKIE: Well, her denial was in her answer, 
m 
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paragraph 9, which my notes say 9, 13, 16 and 19. Let me grab 
that. 
THE COURT: Okay, and then where do I look in the memo? 
MS. McCONKIE: Oh, excuse me. The memorandum was on 
page 2, I believe. The memorandum in support of Defendant 
Bullen's motion for summary judgment, page 2, but I think that 
had to do, your Honor, with when defendant conceded for the 
purpose of the motion that the plaintiff became aware of the 
relationship between her husband and the defendant. 
MR. FERGUSON; I think I made — my opening memo, page 
2 — 
THE COURT: I think that's where I was looking, but — 
MR. FERGUSON: — paragraph 5 of the statement of 
undisputed facts. ^Plaintiff alleges that both she and the 
then husband were in individual therapy with Ms. Bullen, an 
allegation which Ms. Bullen denies, complained in paragraphs 
13 and 19. However, for purposes of this motion for summary 
judgment only, Ms. Bullen does not dispute this allegation." 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you for helping me find that. 
Ms. McConkie, did I — was there anything else you needed to 
add? 
MS. McCONKIE: No. 
THE COURT; Okay, thank you. Rebuttal? So where does 
that leave me with regard to whether or not there is a disputed 
fact of therapist/patient relationship? 
4£J 
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MR- FERGUSON: First time Ifve heard it. I don't think 
it's a disputed fact for purposes of this motion. If you look 
at the complaint, at those paragraphs 13 and 19, it's pretty 
clear that Ms. Dowling alleges that she was in therapy with 
Ms. Bullen. She says, * m late %94 Dowling's family members 
began counseling sessions with Bullen in order to work through 
personal problems." 
"Dowling along with her family attended numerous 
counseling sessions with Bullen. In December X9A — * and 
presumably later than late %94, but I don't know — ^Dowling's 
two daughters began counseling with Bullen. In February *95 
Dowling along with their two daughters and James began family 
counseling with Bullen. As a result of Bullen's position as a 
counselor, Bullen occupied a special position of trust in the 
eyes of plaintiff. The family or various members of the family 
attended counseling with Bullen until June of *96." 
I don't know how it could be any plainer than that. 
She's alleging that Ms. Bullen was her therapist and Ms, Bullen 
breached the therapy relationship with her by disclosing her 
confidences, by inflicting negli — or negligently inflicting 
emotional distress, and by breaching the code of ethics which 
does prohibit sexual relations between therapists and patients« 
The summary judgment motion is directed at the 
allegations of the complaint, and if it's the case that 
Ms. Bullen — or that Ms. Dowling is not claiming — is not 
I£)0 
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going to sue Ms, Bullen for being her therapist and for 
committing malpractice during the therapy, then there's no 
lawsuit. There's nothing for us to fight about. So either 
she is the therapist and she filed too late, or she's not the 
therapist and has no duty. It can't be both. She can't walk 
both of those paths. They're different paths. 
So for Ms, McConkie now to stand up and sayf *Wellf 
we're going to take the allegations of the answer instead of 
the complaint," and say there's an issue of fact I think 
ignores the whole crux of the motion for summary judgment, 
which is to say, *Let's assume your complaint's true. You 
filed it too late. You can't bring the claim." 
There's also a couple of other issues that I think 
need to be clarified. An alienation of affections claim does 
not begin to run when a person discovers a legal injury. That 
is a medical malpractice statute requirement. It is not a 
requirement for the beginning of a statute of limitations on 
alienation of affections. 
There is no case law and no statute that gives the 
plaintiff the right to postpone filing an alienation of 
affections claim until she discovers her legal injury. She's 
confusing the medical malpractice statute with the garden 
variety catchall statute. They are different/ and it's the 
medical malpractice statute that gives the plaintiff the 
benefit of waiting until the legal injury is discovered. 
*++.m\\/*j v/i i i\v» T \J igJUZl 
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1 So her argument that she didn't discover her legal 
2 I injury either means that she recognizes its governed by the 
3 medical malpractice statute, or she has no right to claim legal 
4 injury. I mean, you canft do both of those. 
5 The other issue that I think is confused is that 
6 I Ms. Dowling is basing her argument on when she concluded there 
7 was no hope in saving the marriage. That is not an alienation 
8 of affections claim. It's the alienation of her husband's 
9 affection that is the basis of an alienation of affections 
10 claim. Not the alienation of Ms. Dowling's affections. 
11 I When Ms. Dowling concluded that her marriage was 
12 I beyond repair, that she couldn't survive in that marriage is 
13 irrelevant. The issue is when did James conclude that there 
14 was no longer any value to the marriage. 
15 THE COURT: But either way isn't that when the decree 
16 was entered? 
17 MR. FERGUSON: Well, you could certainly make that 
18 I argument, but I think the stronger argument is when he filed 
19 I the petition for divorce, which was in January %96, nine months 
20 earlier. 
21 The effort to try and create issues of fact about the 
22 merits of the alienation of affections claim also misses the 
23 point. We don't stand here and say that Ms. Bullen is immune 
24 from suit for alienation of affections. We simply say that if 
25 you're going to sue her for alienation of affection, you have 
..-.Ktv.*,
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1 to do it within two years, which she didn't do. So now it's 
2 I too late. 
3 There's no issue of immunity. There's no argument 
4 that doctors get away with certain torts that the rest of the 
5 world doesn't get away with. The fact of the matter is that 
6 the healthcare malpractice statute makes some statutes of 
7 limitation longer. 
8 For example, intentional torts. The example put by 
9 Ms- McConkie of a doctor throwing a book at the patient would 
10 normally be governed by a one year statute of limitations, but 
11 under the Medical Malpractice Act it's two years. Likewise an 
12 alienation of affections claim which normally might be four 
13 years under the Medical Malpractice Act is shortened to two. 
14 The point that's discussed in the Jensen case is 
15 that the legislature wanted to make claims against healthcare 
16 providers uniform. There's a wide variety of torts, there's 
17 a wide variety of contracts, wide variety of warranty issues, 
18 all of which have different statutes of limitations and the 
19 legislature said, xxWe're going to simplify that, and we're 
20 going to make them all fit within this two-year statute. It's 
21 two years from when you knew or should have known.'' Because of 
22 that, you get two years on an alienation of affections claim. 
23 That's the thrust of the Jensen holding. 
24 I think it's fair to say that there probably are 
25 some factual questions that relate to whether there was an 
l£j 
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alienation of affections. Certainly Ms. Bullen doesn't admit 
to anything. She thinks Ms. Dowling is completely wrong, but 
for purposes of the summary judgment motion, we simply sayr 
^Let's assume it's all true. Did you file on time?" No, you 
didn't. So the case has to be dismissed. 
Unless the Court has additional questions, and if I 
can clarify anything else for you, I'll sit down and shut up. 
THE COURT: Okay. I think you've both answered all my 
questions and I appreciate you both coming in today so that I 
could ask them. I'm going to review the Jensen case, and I'll 
issue a written ruling as soon as I can, 
MS. McCONKIE: Your Honor, would you like me -- would 
you like the cases of alienation of affection statute, would 
you like me to copy them? 
THE COURT: I do have copies of all of the cases. I 
just didn't have a chance to review them before I came into 
Court today. Thanksr though. Thanks, Counsel. We'll be in a 
brief recess. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
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KATHLEEN BULLEN, TROLLEY CORNERS 
FAMILY THERAPY CLINIC, a : 
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Before the Court is defendant Bullenfs Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Court having heard oral argument of counsel and 
having further reviewed the pleadings filed in this matter, now 
enters the following ruling. 
The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. All 
of the allegations in the plaintiff• s Complaint arise out of the 
plaintifffs claim that defendant Bullen committed malpractice in 
the course of treatment of various members of plaintiff's family. 
The applicable statute of limitations therefor is contained within 
the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, which provides a statute of 
limitations of two years. It is clear that this action was filed 
more than two years after plaintiff discovered the injury. 
Although plaintiff argues that no therapist/patient relationship 
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existed, for the purposes of this Summary Judgment the record 
indicates that such a relationship existed. 
Based upon that, the Court grants the defendant's Summary 
Judgment Motion and directs counsel for defendant Bullen to prepare 
an Order consistent with this ruling. 
Dated this"^ day of October, 2001. 
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